










The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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The percentage of Australians taking up Private Health Insurance (PHI) was in decline 
following the introduction of Medicare in 1984 (PHIAC). To arrest this decline the 
Australian Government introduced a suite of policies, between 1997 and 2000, to create 
incentives for Australians to purchase private health insurance. These policies include an 
increased Medicare levy for those without PHI on high incomes, introduced in 1997, a 
30% rebate for private hospital cover (introduced 1998), and the Lifetime Health Cover 
(LHC) policy where PHI premiums are set at age of entry, increasing for each year older 
than 30 years (introduced 2000). In 2004 the longitudinal study on Household Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA), included a series of questions on private 
health insurance and hospital use. We used the HILDA data to investigate the 
demographic, health and income factors related to the PHI decisions, especially around 
the introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover policy. Specifically we investigate who was 
most influenced to purchase PHI (specifically hospital cover) in 2000 as a response to the 
Lifetime Health Cover policy deadline. Are those who have joined PHI since the 
introduction of LHC different from those who joined prior to LHC? What are the 
characteristics of those who have dropped PHI since the introduction of LHC? We model 
the PHI outcomes allowing for heterogeneity of choice and correlation across 
alternatives.  After controlling for other factors, we find that LHC prompted moderately 
well-off working age adults (30-49 yrs) to purchase before the 2000 deadline. Young 
singles or couples with no children, and the overseas born were more likely to purchase 
since 2000, while the relatively less well-off continue to drop PHI in spite of current 
policy incentives.  
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1. Introduction 
The universal Australian public health care system, Medicare, was introduced in 
1984. Subsequently the private health insurance coverage of the population fell 
steadily, reaching its lowest level of just over thirty percent in 1998. Commonwealth 
governments of both political persuasions argued that if the decline of private health 
insurance was to continue it would place unacceptable pressure on public hospitals in 
the future. In response, the Commonwealth introduced a suite of policies to create 
incentives for Australians to purchase private health insurance with the aim of 
promoting choice and relieving pressure on the public hospital system.  
In 1997, the government introduced a private insurance tax rebate for low income 
singles and families and a tax surcharge (one percent of taxable income) for those on 
high incomes. The tax surcharge could be avoided by purchasing private health 
insurance. In 1999, the income-tested rebate for low earners was replaced with a 
constant thirty percent premium rebate, available to all regardless of income. In 2000, 
the Lifetime Health Cover policy (LHC) reform introduced an age gradient into the 
premium schedule. After July 15 2000, all new private insurance enrollees aged over 
30 pay a premium loading for each insurance plan of two percent for each year of age 
over 30 at entry. The loading is capped at 70 percent. Irrespective of age, people 
already insured prior to the deadline who maintain their private insurance coverage 
are exempt from the loading. The 2000 reform was accompanied by extensive 
publicly-funded advertising under the theme “Run for Cover”. As a result of these 
insurance incentives, private insurance coverage in Australia increased from 30.1 
percent in 1998 to 43 percent in 2000, a jump of nearly 50 percent, most of which 
occurred just prior to the July deadline.  There was also a change in the mix of the 
insured population with large fall in the percentage aged over 65. 
Three policies have remained relevant since 2000: 
1)  the increased Medicare levy for ‘high income’ earners who did not purchase 
private hospital cover; 
2)  the 30%  rebate for the purchase of hospital cover; and 
3)  the Lifetime Health Cover policy.  
The Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) is the industry 
regulator and part of its role is to collect statistics on trends over time. PHIAC data on 
membership is available quarterly in 5 year age bands showing the net change in 
coverage over time. Figure 1 shows the PHIAC trends in PHI coverage for working-
aged adults from 1997 to 2006. The dramatic increase in coverage prior to the LHC 
deadline is very clear, with the largest rates of increase for those aged between 30 and 
54. After 2000 however, the trends are quite different by age with generally falling 
coverage for the younger age bands, and increasing cover for the two oldest groups.  
In this paper we explore heterogeneity of private health insurance choices taking 
advantage of the longitudinal HILDA dataset. Almost all of the literature on demand 
for private health insurance focuses on the purchase decision. This is the first 
Australian research, and one of very few papers internationally, to model the decision 
to discontinue private health insurance, as well as the purchase decision. We are 
particularly interested in distinguishing the factors motivating entry and exit since the 
LHC deadline. We investigate demographic, family, health and income factors related 
to respondent’s private health insurance decisions in the light of the insurance  
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incentives. We focus on whether these policy changes attracted a different 
demographic to purchase private health insurance than previously and which 
demographic groups chose to drop their insurance cover. Since the incentives aim to 
reduce pressure on the public hospital system, we focus on hospital cover, whether or 
not the individual has ancillary cover for dental, optical and allied health services.. 
We identify six distinct groups: those who purchased private hospital cover before 
LHC; those who reported they took up private hospital cover in 2000 in response to 
the LHC deadline; those who took up private hospital cover after 2000 (i.e. after the 
LHC premiums were in place); those who dropped private hospital cover after 2000; 
those who had dropped private hospital cover prior to 2000 and remained uninsured; 
those who had never purchased private hospital cover. We model the insurance 
decisions using a multinomial probit model which allows for heterogeneity of choice 
and correlation across alternatives and use our preferred model to simulate predicted 
probabilities for each alternative outcome. To illustrate our results we constructed a 
series of hypothetical index individuals for each outcome alternative of interest, 
setting the levels of the explanatory variables to give a high predicted probability of 
choice for that alternative. We then use the index individual as a base to examine the 
effect of a change in the level of each explanatory variable on the probability of 
choice for the alternative of interest, keeping all other variables at the level of the 
index individual.  
We focus our analysis on the three groups whose decisions would be affected by 
LHC: those who joined PHI because of the lifetime Health cover deadline, those who 
joined after the deadline and those who dropped hospital cover since the introduction 
of the policy. 
2. Literature 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) review the large literature on the demand for health 
insurance much of which builds from the key papers of Arrow (1963) and Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) Besley, Hall and Preston (1999) find that demand for 
supplementary insurance in the UK is related to waiting times for public treatment 
and that those with private coverage have higher income, tend to be middle-aged and 
be conservative voters. Propper (2000) similarly finds that richer, more conservative 
individuals who have less commitment to equity goals are more likely to use private 
services in the UK. In Ireland where the public health system is most similar to 
Australia, Harmon and Nolan (2001) find that large increases in insurance coverage 
over the last three decades is driven by perceptions about waiting time and quality in 
the public system, as well as the usual socioeconomic and demographic factors. Finn 
and Harmon (2006) estimate a dynamic model of supplementary insurance demand 
for Ireland and find that cover is associated with higher income and education, and 
better health status. In their dynamic specification they show that persistence is a 
major factor in insurance demand and that inclusion of insurance status in the 
previous period reduces the impact of socioeconomic and health factors.  
The US empirical literature focuses either on employer-based insurance for the 
population not eligible for public health programs or the purchase of supplementary 
insurance (Medigap) for those aged over 65 who are eligible for the public Medicare 
program. For the non-Medicare population, Abraham, Vogt and Gaynor (2002), using 
the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, find that health plan take-up and  
  3
switching is relatively unresponsive to price. Using the same survey, Cardon and 
Hendel (2001) estimate a structural model of employee-based health insurance for 
single individuals; they find no evidence of adverse selection and that health 
insurance as a fringe benefit is highly related to income. Using 1994 data on postal 
employees, Gruber and Ebonya (2003) similarly find a very small price effect on 
insurance take-up and modest movements between plans.  
Using semiparametric techniques Bajari et al (2006) estimate a structural model of 
consumer demand for health insurance and medical utilisation using the US Health 
and Retirement Study which includes both working individuals and those eligible for 
Medicare. Their results suggest that differences in self reported health status do not 
vary much between different insurance plans; they conclude that the incentive to sort 
between plans is limited in the setting of most concern to consumers ie a severe 
negative health shock.  
For the population eligible for Medicare, Wilcox-Gok and Rubin (1994) examine the 
decision to purchase supplementary private insurance. They find that the purchase 
decision is associated with household income, health status and functional limitations, 
as well as age, sex, race and education. Ettner (1997) estimates a logit model of 
supplementary insurance demand using the 1991 Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey and finds that the probability of insurance purchase increases strongly with 
wealth. A recent study by Fang, Keane and Fang (2008) finds strong evidence of 
advantageous selection in supplementary insurance for the US Medicare population. 
However, they also find that information on cognitive ability can account for this.  
In France, the motivation for supplementary insurance purchase is to reduce co-
payments associated with public treatment. In this setting, Buchmueller et al (2004) 
find that insurance cover is unrelated to health status. In Catalonia attitudes to public 
or private health care matter: 22% of the population state that they would never 
purchase private cover (Costa-Font & Font-Vilalta, 2004). 
Previous Australian research on private health insurance purchase falls into three 
categories: analysis of insurance demand prior to the reforms of the last decade; 
analyses of the PHI incentives overall; and analyses of the incentives focusing on 
heterogeneity across individuals or families. The factors influencing the demand for 
private insurance coverage prior to LHC have been examined using the ABS National 
Health Surveys (NHS). Using the NHS surveys undertaken between 1983 and 1995, 
Schofield et al (1997) examines the changing composition of PHI coverage of the 
population. They identify a decline among middle income families compared with 
both upper and lower income groups and a smaller decline among families headed by 
a person over 55 years old than younger families. They also find that rising premiums 
had the greatest impact on low income families. Using the 1989 and 1995 NHS data 
respectively, Savage and Wright (2003) and Barrett and Conlon (2003) found a strong 
association between demand for insurance and income. Savage and Wright also 
examine the association between utilisation and insurance for private hospital length 
of stay.  They found that insurance could more than double the average length of 
private hospital stay.  
The introduction of the insurance incentives generated considerable research. Butler  
(2002) analysed the "carrots and sticks" financial incentives for PHI and found that 
the membership uptake that occurred was largely attributable to LHC, a policy that  
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had virtually no cost to government. He also examined the changing age composition 
of the insured pool after September 2000, and observed that the increasing average 
age of those insured suggests the possible reappearance of an adverse selection 
dynamic. He argues that the 'trick' delivered by LHC may not be maintained in the 
longer term. Walker et al (2005) present an historical analysis of the impacts of the 
different PHI incentives in terms of the proportion of Australians having hospital 
insurance cover by age, gender and socioeconomic status . They found that the 
increased cover was due mainly to the richest 20% of the population. Among the 
poorest 40% the impact was minimal.  
Dawkins et al (2004) found strong evidence that households most affected by the PHI 
policy changes were those with high socio-economic standing and high income and 
little evidence that the policies alleviated the burden of public hospitals. Vaithianathan  
(2004) argued that the subsidy to health insurance should have been an effective 
means to increase PHI coverage, but was ineffective because community rating was 
ineffective. Despite community rating rules which prohibit age adjusted premiums, 
Household Expenditure Survey data indicate that young adults pay considerably less 
for their insurance than older adults. She concluded that insurers circumvented 
community rating through plan design, screening older consumers into more 
expensive plans. She also found that the penalty of 2 per cent per year for delaying 
insurance, introduced as part of the lifetime cover plan, is too low to be effective.  
Doiron et al (2008) investigated the relationship between ex ante risk and private 
health insurance using the NHS 2001 and found a strong positive association between 
self-assessed health and private health cover and identify the factors responsible for 
favourable selection. They found that those persons who engage in risk-taking 
behaviours are simultaneously less likely to be in good health and less likely to buy 
insurance. 
Palangkaraya and Yong (2005) attempted to isolate the effects of the different 
insurance incentives using 1995 and 2001 NHS data. Focusing on single individuals 
their counterfactual analysis indicates that LHC caused between 42% and 75% of the 
overall increase in PHI membership. Ellis and Savage (2005) used the NHS 2001 data 
to estimate a model of individual decisions to enroll in private health insurance in 
order to understand the effects of the PHI reforms on the age and income distribution 
of those with private cover over time. They conclude that the major impacts of the 
three reforms can be understood as a broad-based “Run for Cover”, a response to a 
deadline and an advertising blitz, rather than a pure price response. They also found 
that LHC would have had a larger impact on coverage for families without the 30% 
premium subsidy.   
Lu and Savage (2006) used the 2001 NHS to examine the impact of increased private 
insurance coverage on use of both public and private hospital systems focusing on 
how behaviour varies with insurance duration. They found that those who enrolled in 
response to the incentives behave more like the uninsured than the long-term insured. 
While the insurance incentives substantially increased the proportion of the 
population with supplementary private insurance, the impact on the use of the public 
system by new entrants appears to be quite modest.. 
Feibig et al (2006)analysed private health insurance behaviours among respondents to 
the 2001 NHS to identify insurance ‘types’ according to stated reasons for buying  
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health insurance. They found considerable evidence of unexplained heterogeneity 
among the privately insured population and that insurance type is significantly 
associated with hospital utilisation, particularly the probability of being admitted as a 
public or private patient. The government’s insurance incentives were more attractive 
to particular types of the insured population and this limits the effectiveness of the 
incentives in reducing pressure on the public hospital system. 
There is no existing analysis of the decision to discontinue private insurance cover in 
Australia and internationally there are few studies that focus on this. Gruber and 
Madrian (1995) model the discontinuation of insurance following job loss in the US. 
Sommers (2005) estimates disenrollment among children eligible for the US 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); over a 12 month period he finds a 
drop-out rate of 28%, almost half of whom remained eligible for assistance. Children 
of more educated parents were more likely to move to private insurance while black 
children and very young children were more likely to become ineligible. Lower levels 
of subsidy also resulted in a higher rate of drop outs.   
3. Data 
The Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA) study is a 
longitudinal population survey which commenced in 2001. HILDA is a representative 
sample of Australian households. In the baseline 2001 survey data was collected on 
all members of 7,682 selected households and individuals aged 15 years and over 
were interviewed. Respondents have been followed over time and interviews are 
conducted every 12 months. New household members are included in subsequent 
interview waves, while ever they share a household with a baseline respondent. The 
survey covers questions on income, expenditures, education, occupation and other 
roles, demographics, health, family formation, risk behaviours, attitudes and life 
events.  The HILDA sample and method have been described in detail elsewhere (see 
http://melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/ ). 
In Wave 4 of HILDA conducted in 2004, respondents were asked a series of questions 
on private health insurance and hospital usage. Did respondent currently have private 
health insurance? If yes, did it include hospital cover? When did he/she join? And if 
he/she joined in 2000 was that as a response to the LHC policy? If the respondent was 
not currently insured, had he/she ever had hospital cover in the past and if so how 
long ago did he/she drop hospital cover? 
Since the questions on private health insurance cover were only asked in Wave 4 of 
HILDA we adopt a retrospective cohort approach to model the factors related to 
private health insurance decisions. Our outcome variable depends on the most recent 
decision in relation to the purchase of private hospital cover insurance recorded in 
Wave 4 of HILDA. From the responses to the above questions we create six 
outcomes. 
1.  Joined prior to LHC: those who purchased private hospital cover before LHC 
2.  Joined because of LHC: those who stated they took up private hospital cover 
in 2000 because of LHC.  
3.  Joined after LHC: those who took up private hospital cover after the 2000 
LHC deadline. 
4.  Left after: those who dropped private hospital cover after 2000.  
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5.  Left prior: those who had previously had insurance cover but had dropped it 
before 2000, including those who still only held extras cover. 
6.  Never: those who had never purchased private hospital cover, including those 
who had only ever held ancillary cover. 
Our explanatory variables are responses to questions recorded in Wave1 of HILDA. 
We chose Wave 1 as the baseline because that was the closest time period to the 2000 
policy changes and therefore was the best available measure of the respondent’s status 
at the time of the policy changes. In addition, differences between Waves 1 and 2 in 
income, financial assets and health were calculated to measure the effect of 
prospective changes after 2001 on more recent decisions to purchase or drop private 
hospital cover after the introduction of LHC. 
Explanatory variables fall into five categories: 
1.  Demographic variables included age, sex, region of residence, education, 
occupation, country of birth and languages spoken other than English. Family 
formation variables included couple status, the number of respondent’s 
resident children < 25 years and the age of the youngest resident child. 
2.  Health variables included long-term illness or disability, the Short Form 
Health Survey (SF-36) items and scales, alcohol consumption, smoking status 
and exercise. 
3.  Financial variables included individual, partners and household wages, 
benefits and financial assets, attitudes to financial risk and self-assessed 
prosperity.   
4.  Retrospective life events  in the 12 months prior to 2001 included self-report of 
financial improvement or worsening, losing a job, being promoted, changing 
jobs, retiring, marriage, separation, reconciliation, becoming pregnant, a new 
baby, injury or illness for self or family.  
5.  Prospective changes in the 12 months from 2001 to 2002 included personal 
and household income and financial assets, changes in disability/illness and 
SF-36 self-assessed health. 
In the analysis we used the balanced panel of respondents aged 18 years and over who 
had complete data for the relevant variables in Wave1 to Wave 4. There were 13,191 
respondents 18 years and over in Wave 1 of HILDA. The balanced panel aged 18 
years and over from Waves 1 to 4 comprised 9,377 respondents, 98% of whom 
answered the self-completion questionnaire in Wave 1. Eight respondents did not 
answer the questions on private health insurance in Wave 4. This gave a final sample 
of 9,196. Half of the sample (49.6%) held private hospital insurance in 2004. A 
further 336 (3.6%) held ancillary cover only. The private health insurance choice 
(hospital cover only) categories used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.A quarter of 
respondents (25.7%) had never held any private hospital cover and another 20% had 
dropped private hospital cover prior to 2000, the majority (1,572 of 1,857) prior to 
1998. Of those who had dropped private hospital cover after 2000, half (219 of 424) 
had done so between 2000 and 2002. Similar numbers had joined after LHC as had 
dropped their cover since 2000 (448 and 424). 
4. Modelling strategy 
Multinomial logit  
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In order to examine the explanatory variables on PHI choice, we assume that each 
individual has an unobserved utility associated with each of six discrete outcomes. 
Individuals then choose the alternative with the highest utility.  
With a linear random utility model this implies: 
   6 ,.., 1  ; )  1  (  = + ′ = j  x  U  ij  j  i  ij  ε  β    
where x represents the vector of control variables. Under the assumption that the 
disturbances are distributed as iid type I extreme value, the random utility framework 
motivates the use of the multinomial logit model.  
While the multinomial logit model is limited by the assumption of “independence of 
irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) where a person’s preference for one choice alternative is 
independent of his/her preference for another alternative, it is a useful model to use in 
a initial analysis to determine a parsimonious specification. A multinomial logit 
model was fitted with the six PHI categories as the outcome. All available explanatory 
variables were included in the full model in families of related variables, specifically 
demographics, relationship and family formation, education and occupation, health, 
wages, benefits and financial assets, health risk and financial risk, retrospective self-
reported life changes, prospective changes in income and financial assets. Variables in 
the full model were reduced using backward elimination. The objective was to retain 
in the model those variables from each family with the greatest explanatory power, 
without omitting any important variables from the model. Each family was reduced in 
the presence of all other variables. Each variable in the family was tested in turn 
starting with the least significant. The variable was kept or dropped based on the 
likelihood ratio test (alpha = .05) and the next least significant variable was tested and 
so on. The next family was then reduced the same way. Age, sex, health and income 
have been found to be important explanatory variables for health insurance behaviour 
and were therefore included in the model regardless of their significance in the 
sample. 
A likelihood ratio test compared the final model with the full model to ensure that the 
backward elimination procedure had not omitted any important explanatory variables. 
In addition the coefficients in the final model were compared with the full model to 
identify any substantial changes. 
  
The variables retained in the final model were age, sex, partner status, number of 
children, age of youngest child, occupation, education, language, country of birth, 
region of residence, self-assessed health, disability or long-term illness, smoking 
status, weekly exercise, individual wages, benefits and financial assets, partner’s 
wages and financial assets, total household wages, self-reported prosperity and 
attitude to financial risk, recent loss of job, recent illness or disability in the family, 
recent worsening of financial situation, recently married, prospective changes in 
household wages, benefits and financial assets. 
The final set of variables was inspected for functional form. Age was entered as a 
spline with break-points at age 31, 46 and 66 to capture the age-related effects of the 
LHC policy. Positive financial assets and negative financial assets each predicted a 
greater probability of having private health insurance relative to no financial assets.  
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Therefore to capture this non-linear relationship, financial assets was fitted as two 
ordinal variables, positive financial assets with 6 categories ($0 to $9999, $10,000 to 
$19,999,…..,$40,000 to $49,999, $50,000 and above) and negative financial assets 
with 2 ordinal categories (< -$10,000, $0 to -$9999).  
Smoking status that was missing for Wave 1 was imputed from later waves of the 
panel where possible. There were 510 observations with incomplete data that were 
omitted from the model (5.5% of the balanced panel). The number of complete cases 
in the final model was 8,686. 
Multinomial probit 
 
In a multinomial logit the error term is assumed to be due to random variation or 
noise, unrelated to the outcome alternatives. In many choice situations however, 
deviations from the expected outcome may in part be explained by individual 
variation in taste related to unobserved characteristics of the alternatives rather than 
completely due to random error. Furthermore, these variations in taste could be 
expected to be correlated across choice alternatives, depending on the similarity 
between the available alternatives. In this analysis of private health insurance choices, 
specific categories may be related depending on a person’s preferences for or against 
private health insurance. If this is the case, the multinomial logit model would not 
pass the IIA test. This was confirmed in our analysis by conducting the Small-Hsiao 
test for IIA on the multinomial logit model that gave a significant test statistic with p-
value less than 0.001.  
 
Therefore we used a multinomial probit model as a way of modelling variations in 
taste across alternatives. The multinomial probit model is again based on equation (1) 
but assumes the error term for each alternative is normally distributed, but allows 
error terms to be heteroskedastic to accommodate taste variations and to be correlated 
across alternatives. The unrestricted multinomial probit model allowing the error 
terms to be heteroskedastic and freely correlated across alternatives was compared to 
a model with error terms restricted to be homoskedastic and equi-correlated across 
alternatives. The unrestricted multinomial probit fitted the data better than the 
restricted model with the associated likelihood ratio test being highly significant with 
p < .0001. 
Predicted probabilities 
The final unrestricted multinomial probit model was used to simulate predicted 
probabilities for a series of hypothetical observations created to observe the effect of 
changing the level of each explanatory variable on the estimated probability of the 
alternative outcome. A series of index individuals were created, one for each outcome 
alternative, as a base to examine the effects of each explanatory variable on the 
probability of that particular outcome. The model coefficients were used to select 
levels of the explanatory variables to create an individual with a high probability for a 
particular outcome. The explanatory variables were then varied one level at a time to 
estimate their effects on the probability of the alternative of interest, keeping all other 
variables at the level of the index individual. Index individuals were created for the 
three alternatives of most interest; purchasing hospital cover because of lifetime 
health cover, joining after 2000, and leaving after 2000. The effects of age were 
estimated holding all other explanatory variables at the level of the sample mean.   
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4. Results 
A summary of the characteristics of the total sample and each choice category is 
shown in Table 2. Respondents with private hospital cover in 2004 were more likely 
in 2001 to have tertiary qualifications, to be living in a major city, to be a non-smoker 
and have higher average wages than those without insurance. A greater proportion of 
those who took up hospital cover in response to LHC policy were couples with 
children, compared to the other groups. Those who joined private hospital cover after 
2000 had a marked increase in household wages from 2001 to 2002. In contrast those 
who dropped private hospital cover after 2000 had a marked decrease in household 
wages from 2001 to 2002. 
TABLES 1 AND 2 NEAR HERE 
The characteristics of the three index individuals are summarised in Table 3 along 
with their predicted probabilities for each choice alternative. 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
Joined because of LHC 
As shown in Table 3 the index individual for joining private health insurance because 
of LHC is a 40 year old with a partner and one child aged 5-14 years, who is a non-
smoker with no long-term health conditions, employed in a professional occupation 
with tertiary qualifications, with an annual wage of $100,000 and no financial assets, 
whose partner is not working. The estimated probability of joining because of LHC 
for the index individual is 38%, much higher than the overall sample rate of 6%. The 
probability of joining prior to LHC is also higher for this individual than for the 
sample rate (55% versus 39% in sample). 
 
TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
The effect of age on the probability of joining because of LHC, holding all other 
variables at the sample mean, are shown in Figure 2 and the effects of changing the 
levels of other variables for the index individual are shown in Table 4. To provide a 
comparison with those who joined prior, Table 4 also shows the changes in 
probability of having joined prior to LHC for each change in the level of the LHC 
index individual. 
In summary the characteristics that describe those with the greatest predicted 
probability of having purchased private hospital cover in 2000 because of LHC are: 
•  being aged 31-45 years; 
•  having 1 school-aged child; 
•  being on a single income between $60k and $120k; 
•  being in a professional occupation; 
•  having no financial assets in 2001; 
•  self-reporting financial circumstances as “just getting by”; 
•  having had an injury or illness to a family member in the 12 months prior to 
2001; 
•  being born in Asia/Pacific. 
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Being recently married, higher partner’s wages and higher financial assets reduced the 
probability of joining because of LHC deadline relative to having already joined 
before the introduction of the LHC policy. Having a larger younger family also 
decreased the probability of joining because of the LHC deadline relative to having 
already joined prior.  
Variables that did not affect the probability of joining because of LHC, included 
smoking status, having a long term disability or health problem, occupation or 
qualifications, reporting being financially worse in the 12 months prior to 2001, or 
any changes in income or financial assets following 2001.  
Joined after 2000 
The index individual for joining private hospital cover after the introduction of LHC 
(Joined after 2000) was a 29 year old male with partner and no children, a non-
smoker, with no long-term health conditions, in a professional occupation. The 
estimated probability of having joined after 2000 for the index individual is 40%. The 
effect of age on the probability of joining after 2000 holding all other variables at the 
sample mean, are shown in Figure 3 and changes in probability for changes in the 
levels of the index individual are shown in Table 5.  
In summary the characteristics that describe those with the greatest predicted 
probability of having purchased private hospital cover after 2000 are: 
•  turning 30 years of age after 2000; 
•  being single or in a couple with no children in 2001; 
•  having no financial assets in 2001; 
•  not becoming financially worse-off in the 12 months prior to 2001; 
•  having no increase in benefits from 2001 to 2002; 
•  being from a non-English speaking background and/or born overseas; 
•  having a long-term illness or disability.  
 
Variables with negligible effect on joining private hospital cover after 2000 included 
smoking status, region of residence, having a family member with a recent illness or 
disability and changes in financial assets after 2001. 
Left after 2000 
The index individual for leaving private hospital cover after the introduction of the 
lifetime health cover policy is a 35 year old female, in a working couple with 3 
children, the youngest under 5 years old, who is a regular smoker with no long-term 
illness or disability. The individual’s annual income is $50,000 and her partner’s 
income is $70,000. The estimated probability of the index individual being in the 
group that left private hospital cover after 2000 is 46%. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of age on leaving hospital cover after 2000, with all other 
variables held at the sample mean. Changes in probability for changes in the levels of 
the index individual are shown in Table 6. In summary the characteristics that 
describe those with the greatest predicted probability of having left private hospital 
cover after 2000 were: 
•  having greater household debt in 2001; 
•  reporting becoming financially worse-off in the 12 months prior to 2001;  
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•  having a decrease in wages and an increase in benefits from 2001 to 2002; 
•  reporting taking no financial risks; 
•  being in a non-professional occupation;  
•  being a regular smoker. 
 
Variables with negligible effect on the probability of leaving private hospital cover 
after 2000 included having a disability or long-term health condition, number of 
children and self-assessed prosperity.   
5. Conclusions 
The policies of the last decade in Australia have aimed to change the mix of those 
who hold private health insurance in terms of age and other socio-demographic 
factors. The LHC policy in particular was aimed at attracting younger members into 
PHI. The effect of age on the net purchase of private health insurance since 2000 can 
be seen in the PHIAC statistics shown in Figure 1. However unlike the administrative 
data, the analysis in this paper reveals details of the family, health and financial 
profiles of those who are taking up private health insurance since the introduction of 
LHCand importantly those who are dropping it. After controlling for other factors, we 
find that those who took up private health insurance in 2000 as a response to LHC and 
who still held it in 2004, were somewhat less well-off than their peers of similar age 
and family structure, who had already taken up private health insurance prior to the 
LHC policy. Judging by their similarities to those already insured, the LHC deadline 
group included those who may have been intending to take up health insurance at a 
later stage in life but who brought their decision forward because of the LHC policy. 
The major factors that affected the probability of taking up PHI after 2000 were age, 
number of children and country of birth. Young childless couples and those from a 
non-English speaking background represent a new demographic that was not inclined 
to purchase hospital cover prior to the introduction of the LHC policy. Like the LHC 
deadline group, those who purchased hospital cover after 2000 had fewer financial 
assets or financial commitments than those who had joined prior to the introduction of 
LHC. 
The group who dropped PHI after 2000 may include the “reluctant insurers” who 
joined LHC in response to the “fear” campaign surrounding the introduction of the 
policy (Deeble, 2003; Ellis & Savage, 2005) or for financial reasons (Fiebig, Savage, 
& Viney, 2006). Whatever their motives for purchasing, it appears that declining 
financial circumstances was a major factor for the group that dropped PHI after 2000. 
For the group who were unable to maintain PHI under the current policy incentives, 
the LHC age premiums provide a further affordability barrier to keep them out of PHI 
in the future.  
 
The analysis indicates that income is still a dominant factor in PHI decisions.  
Incentives to increase affordability in terms of 30% rebate and to avoid future PHI 
costs in terms of LHC policy have not been able to attract people on relatively low 
incomes nor hold onto those who experience subsequent declines in income or 
financial assets. 
 
Therefore the effect of the LHC policy may have been to broaden the insured base in 
terms of age, but restrict access to PHI based on income. Taking advantage of the  
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LHC policy required a timely response to the policy, but it also requires that the 
family or individual have the requisite income at the age window for avoiding the 
future LHC penalty. Therefore families and individuals with a flatter or less certain 
income trajectory are penalised by the policy as those who drop out for financial 
reasons pay a penalty on return and those who may delay because of financial reasons 
also pay a penalty. The recent introduction of a sunset clause in the LHC policy which 
reduces the LHC premium loading after 10 years of insurance (Department of Health 
and Ageing, 2006) may go some way to reducing the long-term penalty to the 
currently uninsured but does not address the initial entry hurdle that lower income 




Table 1: Distribution of private hospital 
cover choice categories in HILDA Wave 4 
(2004) 
   N Sample % 
Joined prior to lifetime health cover  3,539  38.5% 
Joined in 2000 in response to LHC  567  6.2% 
Joined after 2000   448  4.9% 
Left after 2000  424  4.6% 
Left prior to 2000  1,857  20.2% 




Table 2: Comparison of selected 
demographic, financial, family and health 
variables in  Wave1 (2001) across private 
hospital cover groups 











Prior Never Total 
N 3,539  567  448  424  1,857  2,361  9,196 
% 38.5%  6.2%  4.9%  4.6% 20.2%  25.7%  100.0% 
Mean age (years)  49.3  42.4  36.7  41.8  53.0  39.8  46.2 
Female  (%)  55.0  50.8 55.4  55.2 54.8 51.3 53.7 
Lives in major city (%)  63.7  62.3  69.2  59.2  46.0  51.9  57.1 
Couple with children (%)  36.2  51.2  27.5  31.8  25.6  33.6  33.7 
Single no children (%)  18.3  16.6  31.5  31.1  29.4  34.7  25.9 
Tertiary qualification (%)  27.7  34.7  32.8  16.8  8.8  13.1  20.3 
Smoker  (%)  13.1  16.6 20.8  29.4 25.5 35.8 22.6 
Long term health 
problem/disability  (%)  18.7  13.1 17.2  24.5 35.2 23.4 23.1 
Self-assessed health 
good or better (%)  87.9  88.9  92.1  85.6  74.9  81.2  83.7 
Born  in  Australia  79.2  77.4 70.8  79.3 77.8 71.7 76.5 
Self-reported finance 
worse prior 12 mths (%)  2.4  2.5  1.6  7.8  4.1  3.3  3.2 
Household  wages  ($)  $60,130  $70,241 $61,341  $46,763 $25,717 $32,599 $46,179 
Individual  benefits  $1,886  $1,159 $1,995  $3,171 $5,787 $5,116 $3,523 
Change in house wages 
2001-02 ($)  $345  $3,183  $6,939  -$4,576  -$297  $634  $559 
Change in household 
benefits 2001-02 ($)  $396  $307  -$553  $1,077  $628  $511  $452 
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Table 3: Characteristic of index individuals 
for “Joined 2000 because of LHC”, “Joined 
after 2000” and “Left after 2000” and 
probabilities of each PHI choice 
Variable  LHC index individual Joined After index 
individual 
Left After index 
individual 
Age  40 years old  29 years old  35 years old 
Sex Male  Male  Female 
Region  Major city  Major city  Major city 
Relationship Partner  Partner  Partner 
Disability No  disability  No disability  No disability 
Language  English only  English only  English only 
Occupation Professional  Professional  Service  worker 
Qualifications Tertiary   Diploma  Diploma 
Country of birth  Australia  Australia  Australia  
Individual wages  $100,000  $60,000  $50,000 
Partner’s wage  Partner's wages $0  Partner's wages $60,000  Partner’s wages 
$70,000 
Individual benefit  $0  $0  $0 
Individual  financial assets  No financial assets  No financial assets          Positive financial 
assets $0-$10,000 
Partner’s financial assets  $0  $0  $0 
Change in household 
wages 2001 to 2002 
$20,000 increase in 
household wages 
$25,000 increase in 
household wages 
$40,000 decrease in 
household wages 
Change in household 
benefits 2001 to 2002 
No change in household 
benefits 
No change in household 
benefits 
$10,000 increase in 
household benefits 
Change in household 
financial assets 2001 to  
2002 
$50,000 increase in 
household financial assets 
$40,000 increase in 
household financial assets 
No change in 
household financial 
assets 
Married previous 12 mths  Not recently married  Not recently married  Not recently married 
Family illness or injury 
previous 12 mths 
Recent family illness   Recent family illness  Recent family illness 
Lost a job previous 12 mths Has not lost a job   Lost a job  Lost a job 
Financially worse previous 
12 mths 
Not financially worse the 
last 12 mths 
Not financially worse the 
last 12 months 
Financially worse the 
last 12 mths 
No of resident children  1 child  No children  3 children 
Age of youngest resident 
child 
Youngest child 5-14 yrs  N/A  Youngest child < 5 yrs 
Regular smoker  Non-smoker  Non-smoker  Smoker 
Financial risk behaviour  Takes average financial 
risks 
Takes high  financial risks  Takes no financial risk 
Self-assessed prosperity  Considers self very 
prosperous 
Considers self very 
prosperous 
Considers self poor 
Exercise 
 
Exercises 3 times weekly  Exercises less than  weekly Exercises less than 
weekly 
Probabilities of each private health insurance choice alternative estimated from multinomial probit
Joined Prior  0.555 0.459 0.239 
Joined because of LHC  0.380  0.075 0.013 
Joined After   0.039 0.401 0.004 
Left After  0.008 0.036 0.479 
Left Prior  0.007 0.014 0.260 
Never  0.010 0.016 0.015  
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Table 4: Change in probability of having 
Joined Because of LHC compared with 
having Joined Prior for changes in the 
levels of the LHC index individual. 
Reference level (LHC index 







Male Female  -0.042  0.049
Age 40  Age 50  -0.081  0.115
 Age  32  0.026  -0.064
 Age  29#  -0.132  -0.132
1 child  No children  -0.032  -0.009
 3  children  -0.083  0.077
Youngest Child 5-14   Youngest Child < 5 yrs  -0.041  0.047
Born Australia English 
speaking only 





  Born Asia/Oceania Non-




  Born Africa/Middle East Non-




Wages $100,000  Wages $0  -0.078  -0.146
 Wages  $40000  -0.024  -0.066
 Wages  $80000  -0.001  -0.016
 Wages  $120000  -0.002  0.012
 Wages  $160,000  -0.011  0.034
Partner’s wages $0  Partners wages $40,000  -0.018  0.037
  Partners wages $100,000  -0.054  0.084
  Partners wages $120,000  -0.066  0.099
  Partners wages $160,000  -0.091  0.127










Recent family illness  No family illness/disability   -0.049  0.032
Not recently married  Recently married~  -0.145  0.048
Very prosperous  Just getting by financially  0.076  -0.083
Not lost job last 12 months  Lost job last 12 months  -0.080  0.040
Exercises 3  times weekly  Exercises less than weekly  -0.070  0.050
# Base = LHC index individual except with no children 




Table 5: Change in probability of having 
Joined After 2000 compared with having 
Joined Prior for changes in the levels of 
the Joined After index individual. 
Reference level (Joined 
After index individual) 








Age 29 years  Age 25 years  -0.042 0.035 
  Age 40 years   -0.270 0.203 
 Age  50  years  -0.347 0.326 
No children  1 child  -0.128 0.118 
Australian born English 
speaking background 
Born Asia/Oceania NESB 
0.240 -0.246 
 Born  Africa/Middle  East 
NESB 0.119 -0.123 
  Born Europe NESB  0.158 -0.158 
  Australian born non-English 
speaking background  0.076 -0.084 
No disability  Disability or long-term 
illness 0.052 -0.045 
With partner  Single ~  0.041 -0.027 
No financial assets 
Financial assets (pos) > 
$50,000 -0.183 0.236 
 
Financial assets (neg) < -
$20,000 -0.113 0.119 
$60,000 Wages  $0  -0.027 -0.083 
 Wages  $40,000  -0.004 -0.025 
 Wages  $100,000  -0.003 0.033 
 Wages  $140,000  -0.013 0.056 
$60,000 Partner’s  wages  $0  -0.013 -0.090 
 Partner’s  wages  $160,000  -0.037 0.095 
No increase in benefits 
2001 to 2002 
$10,000 Increase in 
benefits -0.075 0.020 
Diploma Tertiary  qualification  0.037 -0.036 
diploma school  only  0.081 -0.080 
Professional Trade  -0.062 0.024 
 Service  -0.063 -0.002 
Lost job last 12 months  Not lost job last 12 months  -0.073 0.027 
Not financially worse last 12 
months 
Financially worse off last 12 
months -0.120 0.032 
Exercises less than  weekly  Does no exercise  -0.064 0.062 
~ base = Index individual except partner’s wages $0 and partner’s financial assets $0   
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Table 6: Change in probability of having 
Left After 2000 for changes in the levels of 
the Left After index individual. 
Reference level (Left After 
index individual) 
change in level Change in 
probability Left 
After
Born Australia English speaking 
background 
Born Australia Non-English speaking 
background 
-0.038 
 Born  Asia/Oceania  NESB  0.006
  Born Africa/Middle East NESB  0.051
Wages $50,000  Wages $0  -0.025
 Wages  $20,000  -0.010
 Wages  $80,000  -0.008
 Wages  $120,000  -0.036
 Wages  $160,000  -0.079
Service Professional  -0.072
Lost job  Not lost job last 12 months  -0.059
Age 35   Age 45   -0.143
Positive financial assets < 
$10,000 
Financial assets (pos) $30,000 to 
$40,000 
-0.068
 Financial  assets  $0  0.016
  Financial assets (neg)-$0 to -$10,000  -0.139
  Financial assets (neg)< -$20,000   0.119
Smoker Non-smoker  -0.056
$10,000 increase  No change in benefits 2001 to 2002  -0.049
Financially worse last 12 months  Not financially worse   -0.162
$40,000 decrease in household 
wages 
No change in household wages 2001 to 
2002 
-0.037
$10,000 increase in benefits  No change benefits 2001 to 2002  -0.053
Exercises less than weekly  Exercises 3 times weekly  -0.057
Takes no financial risks  Takes average financial risk  -0.069 
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 Figure 1 
Private hospital cover by age group for  adults 25-64 years: 


































Effect of age on the probability of Joined Because of Lifetime Health 




























Effect of age on the probability of Joined After 2000, all other 

























Effect of age on the probability of Left After 2000, all other variables 
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